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Faulkner: On the Efficacy of Sanctions

Consistently, policy makers have responded to threats of nuclear
development, the rise of autocracies, mass human rights abuses, claimants over
strategic regions, and more geopolitical issues with the use of economic sanctions.
While governments may show an overt willingness to use sanctions as an
effective tool of foreign policy, world leaders are still hotly debating the question
of the efficacy of sanctions. Some have argued that sanctions will generally fail
due to the fact that the sender country will not be able to extract any type of
political concession from the target country. Others counter that states use
sanctions as a symbolic signal of disapproval to a target country’s actions, not as a
tool to reverse any type of political action. What these ideas fail to take into
account is that there is merit to both. Governments can use sanctions merely as
symbols of disapproval or they can use them as tools of economic coercion. Used
to coerce a target country into making some type of political concession,
sanctions are generally more successful against more democratic regimes versus
more autocratic regimes. Conversely, used as symbolic tools, sanctions are
successful at increasing the reputation of the sender country and creating
international norms of how states ought to act.
I. SANCTIONS AS TOOLS OF COERCION

Before diving into what is needed for economic sanctions to be effective as tools
of coercion, it is important to understand the definition of a successful sanction. A
common definition is “a tool for coercing target governments into particular
avenues of response.”1 Therefore, sender states often see the failure to get that
particular response as a failed use of economic sanctions. Empirically, when it
comes to bringing about political change, sanctions generally tend to fail more
than they succeed. At their very best, when sender countries seek modest political
change, sanctions succeed about half the time. Bigger goals, such as regime
change, generally succeed about thirty percent of the time.2 Aside from what
sanctions seek to achieve and their ability to do so, it is important to understand
how economic sanctions are designed to work. At their core, the purpose of
economic sanctions is to harm the target country's economy, causing it pain,3 so
that the country will be forced to decide whether continuing its behavior is worth
the ramifications of being sanctioned or if pain of economic sanctions is great
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enough to concede to the will of the sender country. For the sender state, being
able to recognize if the target country will choose the former or latter choice is
paramount to crafting a sound sanction policy.
Any time a state decides to take an action against another state, whether
that be instigating a military attack or choosing to sanction it, it is taking a
gamble. In order for that gamble to be beneficial to a state they must have
adequate information on the other state with whom it is interacting. Different
regime types will have different responses due to “the institutional constraints of a
political system [that] limit the state’s decision-making process.”4 Therefore,
understanding how different regimes operate and how they are predisposed to
threats and actions made against them is crucial to gauging the success of all types
of foreign policy tools, such as economic sanctions. At face value, economic
sanctions are a clear form of coercion, but in order for sanctions to be effective in
extracting concessions they cannot rely solely on harming target states’
economies. Senders have to understand how economic burdens will translate into
the ways target states will respond politically. Leaders, in general, have the
incentive to stay in power. To do so, leaders have to maintain the favor of those
who have the capacity of granting them power: the selectorate.5 In democracies,
where multiple parties often vie to hold power in office, people perceive the
winning group as the winning coalition. Democratic leaders cater towards
winning coalitions because these coalitions are the people who allowed these
leaders to come to power in the first place. For example, President Donald Trump
is more beholden to Republican voters that won him the presidency than
Democratic voters that voted against him. While these coalitions might be made
up of one or more parties, they generally reflect the political opinion of the
majority of people within a society. In more autocratic regimes, leaders generally
focus more on a few select powerful and wealthy elites, such as the oligarchs in
Russia. If sanctions have the capability to wreak economic havoc within a
country, possibly destabilizing the balance of power within it, then its leaders
“will be concerned with how sanctions might threaten their position”6 and will
react in a way that protects the parties that grant them power.
Historically, democratic regimes have proven to concede more to the
demands of economic sanctions. Democracies tend to be more predictable than
other types of regimes due to how they are organized. Evidently, the purpose of
Susan Hannah Allen, “Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions,”
Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 3 (July 2008): 257,
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any democracy is to cater to all of its constituents. Democracies and their leaders
are characterized by having a great sense of accountability, since democracies
contain a large numbers of people with access to political rights. Leaders in these
types of regimes have the task of choosing between providing public goods or
private goods. Democratic leaders generally choose to focus more on public
goods because granting privileges to a few individuals does not have as large of
an impact on their popularity as providing public goods, such as healthcare or
education, to the masses. In order for leaders to “win and retain office” they must
have “support from ‘masses.’” 7 Therefore, if sanctions deteriorate an economy,
shrinking the resources governments have to provide for public goods,
“democracies are forced either to concede quickly” or cutback on providing
public goods.8 For example, during the Suez Crisis, the United States imposed
sanctions against Egypt, Britain, and France. The democratic countries, France
and Britain, understood “that the economic power of the United States (in
addition to the threat to hurt the strength of the pound on the international market)
could do a good deal of damage to their economies as well as their international
reputations,” so they yielded to the demands of the the United States.9 Britain’s
prime minister at the time, Anthony Eden, was even forced out of office. On the
other hand, the more autocratic regime of Egypt “made limited concessions”
because “sanctions ‘failed to undermine Nasser’s domestic support.’”10 Because
democracies are dependent on providing for a substantial number of people, large
detriments to the economy will have a negative impact on the people, making it
easier for sender states to hypothesize that democratic regimes will make political
concessions if sanctions are placed on them.
On the other end of the political spectrum, in autocratic regimes, it has
proven harder to extract political concessions via the use of economic sanctions.
As previously stated, senders rely on having adequate information about target
countries in order to determine if imposing sanctions will be futile or not. The
political leanings of a democracy can often be gauged by numerous measures,
such as political pollings or past precedents on how citizens choose to vote.
Measures like these seldom exist in autocratic regimes. Instead, the political
leanings are of usually one person or one group, making it harder to pinpoint what
exactly they will do in a given situation. This lack of consistent information of a
target state’s behavior leads to senders being more likely to make demands that
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autocratic targets will refuse11 resulting in a decreased likelihood of efficacy.
Instead of having to cater to the masses to stay in power, autocrats usually seek to
please the political elite, whom often have the same political ideology as them.
These political elites are generally made up of the heads of state bureaucracies
and the military. State bureaucracies, the “managers and chiefs of state-owned
enterprises,”12 are important because they are able to prevent a strong middle class
from forming that might have the potential to undermine the state. Additionally,
the military serves to suppress any type of opposition to the regime in exchange
for privileges and political favors.13 These key groups and elites support the
actions of the regime and work to keep it in power. So, as long as autocrats are
able to satisfy the needs and wants of these people, autocrats will stay in power
despite the imposition of sanctions. Since it is the autocratic leader that generally
yields power over all resources within the country, this leader is able to
manipulate the resources to the benefit of themselves and those that immediately
support them.14 They are able to do this through the promotion of “ black markets
under sanctions and [by] fostering a system of corruption.”15 As a result,
economic sanctions often fail against autocratic regimes because they are unable
to cause enough damage to the people that control the policies and actions of the
state. In 1990, the United States placed comprehensive economic sanctions on
Iraq after invading Kuwait. These sanctions were placed in hopes of tearing down
Saddam Hussein but did the opposite instead. Hussein was not only able to
survive but was able to thrive despite the fall in quality of living for the rest of
Iraqi citizens. By “diverting shrinking public resources to his supporters in the
government and military,” Hussein’s regime was able to continue. The designers
of the sanctions intended for the economy to be hurt, and therefore Hussein’s
power to be hurt, but instead it “increased his importance as a supplier of those
resources and allowed the Iraqi regime” to continue its oppressive rule.16 This was
also seen in the case of Rhodesia. In 1966, the United Nations sanctioned the state
of Rhodesia to bring down white supremacist Ian Smith’s regime, but the attempt
was futile. Smith, with the power of the government, was able to institute a “new
winning coalition” that allowed him to maintain his rule “while all other groups
outside the government's support base suffered disproportionately” from the
11
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damning effects of the sanctions and “were not even able to resist the Smith
government's repressive measures.”17 In this case, not only did sanctions prove to
be ineffective towards an autocratic regime, they also magnified the devastating
conditions that oppressed groups were already facing within the country.
Additionally, sanctions often serve as a rallying point, allowing autocrats to
concentrate power even more. In order to squash and prevent political dissent that
might arise from the decrease in quality of life as a result of sanctions, autocrats
“pinpoint the imposing state(s) as a clear external threat to the nation and
therefore a common enemy to unify the state.”18 This manipulation of the
narrative makes it likely that political supporters of the regime will remain loyal
to it and continue to provide for it and protect it. In countries where there is severe
media censorship, this is particularly true. The cases of Cuba and North Korea,
two countries with heavy media censorship, prove that the power of manipulation
that autocrats hold allows them to cling on to their power despite decades of harsh
sanctions.19 The problem with the use of economic sanctions against autocratic
regimes is that the leader will always have the ability to shield themself from any
harm that sanctions may cause. Those at the bottom of society only suffer more as
hits to the economy lead to funds being diverted from crucial public services.
People find it harder to stay employed, making decent wages, have access to life
saving healthcare, and more. As economies begin to lack the means to support all
citizens, public services, and economic sectors, the people already facing poverty
will only suffer more. Sanctions do more than just decrease a nation’s GDP, but
also magnify the atrocities that poverty and political oppression already foster.
Therefore, sanctions fail in two parts: they fail to create political concessions, and
they fail to create better lives for the people they seek to help.
II. SANCTIONS AS SYMBOLIC TOOLS
Sender states have consistently used sanctions as a way to coerce a state to alter
its behavior, but they have also used them to simply send a message. In most
cases, the sender of sanctions is usually a powerful, more developed country or a
strong international coalition, and the target is often a less developed state. For
these powerful countries and organizations, such as the United States or United
Nations, sanctions act as a way for them to exercise their political prowess on the
global playing field. Especially for the United States, whom the world often sees
Peksen and Drury, “Economic Sanctions and Political Repression,” 401.
Alireza Naghavi and Giuseppe Pignataro, “Theocracy and Resilience Against Economic
Sanctions,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 111, no. 5 (March 2015): 10,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.018.
19
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as the world’s “police force,” staying silent on objectionable policies of other
states may be more harmful to its reputation than the costs of imposing sanctions.
20
In the past, the United States has imposed sanctions on governments to show
disapproval of the violation of human rights. In 1989, the U.S. placed sanctions
against China for the Tiananmen Square massacre.21 The United Nations has
sanctioned ten states; Southern Rhodesia, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and
Sudan,22 for being guilty of mass human rights abuses. Each case has had mixed
results on the efficacy of sanctions and whether or not they were able to stop or
prevent further human rights abuses. One of their main objectives was to show
that the U.N., an organization focused on geopolitical stability and preservation of
human rights, would not stand for the violation of individuals. Overall, economic
sanctions targeted at states that participate in human rights abuses have created a
global norm that human rights abuses will not be tolerated, and actions will be
taken against states that choose to engage in that behavior. Therefore, when
questioning the validity of sanctions, the motives of the sanctions have to be
accounted for. For sanctions that have the motive of coercing, it is easy to
determine their success in the fact that they either create political concessions or
they do not. For sanctions with the motive of simply sending a message about the
sender’s political ideology, the success is not as important. Senders of these types
of sanctions often understand that the target country may not change its action or
behavior. Instead, the sender is more concerned with showing the world that it
will not stand for what it sees as immorality.
III. THE ROAD TO BETTER SANCTIONS
There are myriad factors that go into determining whether or not sanctions will
be successful. Sender states have to understand their motives are to determine if
their sanctions will even achieve what they want them to achieve. Additionally,
sender states need to have adequate information about the target country simply to
begin to craft an effective sanction design. The best way to determine if the
pursuit of sanctions will be futile is to look at the regime of the sender country.
Democratic leaders are easier to oust from power when they act in a way that
upsets the masses, making it easier to determine how they will respond to
sanctions. If sanctions are to hurt the masses, then democrats will most likely
Hufbauer et al., “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,”5.
 uhm Suk Baek, “Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations,” Cornell Law School
B
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concede to the demands of the sender to have sanctions lifted, preserving their
power. On the other hand, autocrats can wield power how they choose and are
only obligated to meet the wants of a few, making it harder for sender states to
extract concessions from them. In these particular cases, sanctions generally hurt
the populations in autocratic states more than they help because sanctions harm
the masses and not those in power. If states continue to use economic sanctions as
legitimate tools of foreign policy, sender states will need to work towards
designing sanctions that will actually affect the people within autocracies that
have the power to make decisions, rather than creating heavier economic burdens
against the common people within these states.
There has been an increasing trend for sender states to impose targeted or
smart sanctions that have the purpose of only affecting the leader of a government
and their inner circle rather than affecting the entire economy, thereby affecting
the entire populace. Sanctions like these can cover multiple actions, such as
freezing the assets of individuals or entities, boycotting of cultural exchanges, or
banning diplomatic interchange, and more.23 All of these are designed to have an
impact on the political elite that are responsible for objectionable or immoral
actions within a country and not the citizens who often do not have a say in
government. These targeted sanctions are hypothesized to be effective even in
autocratic regimes due to the fact that they make it a lot harder for autocrats to
shield themselves and supporters from the harms of sanctions. Additionally,
because they do not affect the entire economy and the people, it is harder for
autocrats to manipulate sanctions into a rallying point to secure more loyalty and
support. In 2005, the Council of the European Union adopted the E.U Best
Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures that would
help the E.U. and its member states design and use these types of sanctions.24
More states should follow suit in moving towards the use of smart sanctions. It is
important to remember that sender states are typically western nations and target
states are usually those in the global south. For western sender states to continue
to use economic, and not targeted, sanctions for the sake of stopping human rights
abuses is hypocritical. Human rights abuses will not be stopped by worsening the
conditions that create human rights abuses in the first place. Sanctions are integral
aspects of foreign policy with strong roots in history, but for these tools to remain
legitimate and function effectively, sender states need to think more about the
repercussions of these sanctions on the most vulnerable around the world.
Ultimately, the ills that plague global society can only be solved by actively

23
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understanding the conditions that foster abuse and corruption and addressing the
people that create them.
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